Randomness is a vital resource for modern day information processing, especially for cryptography. A wide range of applications critically rely on abundant, high quality random numbers generated securely. Here we show how to expand a random seed at an exponential rate without trusting the underlying quantum devices. Our approach is secure against the most general adversaries, and has the following new features: tolerating a constant level of implementation imprecision, requiring only a unit size quantum memory per device component for the honest implementation, and allowing a large natural class of constructions. In conjunct with a recent work by Chung, Shi and Wu (QIP 2014), it leads to robust unbounded expansion using just 2 multi-part devices. It can also be adapted for distributing cryptographic keys securely. The proof begins with a known protocol and proceeds by showing that the Rényi divergence of the outputs of the protocol (for a specific bounding operator) decreases linearly as the protocol iterates. At the heart of the proof are a new uncertainty principle on quantum measurements, and a method for simulating trusted measurements with untrusted devices. A full version of this paper containing additional results developed after the conference submission is available as arXiv:1402.0489. 
BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF RE-SULTS
The problem and its motivations. Randomness is an indispensable resource for modern day information processing. Without randomness, there would be no fast randomized algorithms, accurate statistical scientific simulations, fair gaming, or secure cryptography. While randomness seems to be abundant in everyday life, its efficient and secure generation is a difficult problem. A typical random number generator such as the /dev/random/ generator in Linux kernel, would start with random "seeds", including the thermal noise of the hardware (e.g. from Intel's Ivy Bridge processors), system boot time in nanoseconds, user inputs, etc., and apply a deterministic function to produce required random bits. Those methods suffer from at least three fundamental vulnerabilities: the lack of initial entropy [18, 34, 19] , relying on unproven computational assumptions, and trusting the correctness and truthfulness of the generator [30] . Thus for users demanding highest level of security with the minimum amount of trust, no current solution is satisfactory. Quantum mechanics postulates true randomness, thus provides a promising approach for mitigating those drawbacks. Applying a sequence of quantum operations can increase entropy even when the operations are applied deterministically, as some quantum operations are inherently unpredictable. However, as classical beings, users of quantum random number generators can not be certain that the quantum device -the quantum state inside and the quantum operations applied -is running according to the specification. How can a classical user ensure that a possibly malicious quantum device is working properly?
Special relativity and non-local games provide such a possibility. Consider, for example, the celebrated GHZ game [17] illustrated in Fig. (1) . It is now known [24, 26] that any quantum strategy achieving close to the optimal quantum winning probability must be very close to the optimal strategy itself. Consequently, the output of each component is near perfectly random. Intuitively, one needs only to run the game multiple times (using some initial randomness to choose the No communication among the parts is allowed when the game starts. An optimal classical strategy is for each part to output 1, winning with 3/4 probability. An optimal quantum strategy is for the three parts to share the GHZ state 1 √ 2 (|000 + |111 ), and for each part to measure σ x on input 0, and measure σ y on input 1. This strategy wins with certainty.
input string for each round) and if the observed winning average is close to the optimal quantum winning probability, then the output should be sufficiently random. Therefore, the trust on the quantum device can now be replaced by the (classically verifiable) condition of spatial separation of the different components. The security of the protocol would eventually rest on special relativity, in addition to quantum mechanics. Note that for any cryptographic protocol to be secure, it is necessary to assume that the components involved cannot communicate with the adversary. Thus throughout the paper we make this assumption on the untrusted device(s) in use. Since intra-device communications involve different pairs of components, we treat its restriction a separate item for enforcement or trust. Special relativity provides a classically verifiable method for enforcing such a restriction. It may not be necessary as there are potentially other alternatives for achieving this goal, or may not be feasible if the duration of no-communication is too long for the distance to be practical.
Colbeck and Kent [7, 8] formulated the above framework for untrusted-device randomness expansion. Turning the intuition into rigorous proofs turns out to be rather challenging. Classical security was proved in [31, 16, 32] . While useful, classical security does not guard against quantum adversaries, thus is inadequate as quantum computation is becoming a reality. Furthermore, an expansion protocol without quantum security cannot be safely composed with other quantum protocols. Vazirani and Vidick [40] were the first to prove quantum security. An additional and remarkable feature of their protocol is that it also expands randomness exponentially. Coudron, Vidick, and Yuen [10] broadened the Vazirani-Vidick protocol to allow much more flexibility for the underlying non-local game, but only proved classical security.
Put in a larger context, untrusted-device randomness expansion is part of the broader area of untrusted-device, or "device-independent," quantum cryptography. This area was pioneered by Mayers and Yao [23] , and in parallel by Barrett, Hardy and Kent [3] from the perspective of non-locality with inspirations from Ekert [15] . It has now become an intensively studied paradigm for understanding the power and limitations of quantum cryptography when the underlying quantum devices are imperfect or even malicious. This area includes two tasks related to randomness expansion. The first is randomness amplification [9] , where one wants to obtain near-perfect randomness from a weak random source using untrusted quantum devices (and without any additional randomness). Whereas the current paper focuses on randomness expansion, in a companion paper, Chung, Shi (one of us), and Wu studied the amplification problem [6] . The second related task is untrusted-device quantum key distribution (e.g. [39] ), where two parties attempt to establish a secure secret key using untrusted devices and openly accessible classical communication.
Overview of our results.
In this work, we analyze a simple exponentially expanding untrusted-device randomness expansion protocol (referred to as the one-shot protocol). We prove that its output has exponentially (in the input length) small errors, and is secure against the most general quantum adversaries. More importantly, the protocol accomplishes all of the following additional features, none of which has been accomplished by previous works.
First, the protocol is robust, i.e. tolerating a constant level of "noise", or implementation imprecision. Thus any honest implementation that performs below the optimal level by a small constant amount on average will still pass our test with overwhelming probability. For example, we show that any device which wins the GHZ game with probability at least 0.985 will achieve exponential randomness expansion with probability approaching 1. Our "black-box" formulation of the noise does not refer to the inner-workings of the devices, thus is fairly general. This robustness feature enables simplest -e.g. without adding fault-tolerant overhead -practical implementation, thus is desirable especially at this moment of time when even small scale accurate quantum information processing is still being developed. When fault-tolerant quantum computing techniques become mature, non-robust protocols may become practical. However, when the number of use of a device is not pre-determined, such as in an unbounded expansion to be discussed later, one cannot set the target error threshold for the fault-tolerant implementation. A robust protocol then remains indispensable.
Second, our protocol requires only a unit quantum memory per device component for an honest implementation. In between two rounds of interactions, the different components of the device are allowed to interact arbitrarily. Thus an honest device could establish its entanglement on the fly, and needs only to maintain the entanglement (with only a constant level of fidelity) for the duration of a single game. Given the challenge of maintaining coherent quantum states, this feature greatly reduces implementation complexity. 1 Third, as a consequence of the "Equivalence Lemma" of Chung, Shi and Wu [6] , instances of our one-shot protocol run in alternation between two untrusted devices can achieve robust unbounded expansion with an initial seed of a fixed length. The additively accumulating error parameters remain almost identical to the one-shot errors, since they decrease rapidly.
Finally, our protocol allows a large natural class of games to be used. The class consists of all binary XOR gamesgames whose inputs and outputs are binary and whose scoring function depends on the inputs and the XOR of the outputs -that are strongly self-testing. The latter property says that any strategy that is -close to optimal in its winning probability must be O( √ ) close to a unique optimal strategy in its both its state and its measurements. (We call this "strongly self-testing" because this error relationship is the best possible.) The class of strong self-tests includes both the CHSH game and the GHZ game, which are two commonly used games in quantum information. Broadening the class of usable games has the benefit of enabling greater design space, as different implementation technologies may favor different games. For example, the highly accurate topological quantum computing approach using Majorana fermions is known not to be quantum universal [28] . In particular, Deng and Duan [13] showed that for randomness expansion using Majorana fermions, three qubits are required. Our proof allows the use of Majorana fermions for randomness expansion through the GHZ game. We include two applications of our expansion protocols. Our one-shot protocol can be used as a building block in the Chung-Shi-Wu protocol for randomness amplification. In addition, composing their amplification protocol and our concatenated expansion protocol gives a robust, untrusteddevice quantum protocol that converts an arbitrary weak random source into output randomness of an arbitrary large length with close to optimal error parameters. This composed protocol is rapid (measured against the output length) and secure even against quantum attack. It opens the possibility for unconditionally secure random number generation with the least trust on the randomness source and the implementing device. The second application is to adapt our protocol for untrusted-device quantum key distributions, resulting in a robust and secure protocol with a linear rate of output length (measured against the running time of the protocol.)
After the submission of this work to this conference, Chung and Wu pointed out to us that our protocol achieves cryptographic security. That is, the error parameters are not only exponentially small in the input length, but are also negligible (i.e. smaller than any inverse polynomial function) in the running time of the protocol (which is asymptotically the number of uses of the device.) This is precisely the condition that the output is suitable for cryptographic applicationsthe chance for an adversary to tell the difference between using the protocol output and using the ideal uniform distribution is negligible as measured against the amount of resource used for running the protocol. Also developed after this conference submission and included in the full paper [25] , is that a full translation of randomness expansion to key distribution is indeed valid, resulting in a robust, secure untrusteddevice quantum key distribution protocol that is at the same time exponentially expanding on the input randomness.
Related works. Prior to our work, the Vazirani-Vidick randomness expansion protocol [40] is the first and only work achieving simultaneous exponential expansion and quantum security. However, as far as we know from their analysis, the protocol achieves only inverse polynomial security, thus is not appropriate for cryptographic applications. It is not noise-tolerant, requiring that as the number of games grows, each strategy played by an honest device must approach rapidly to the optimal quantum strategy. It also requires a growing amount of quantum memory as the output length grows. Those drawbacks limit the practical feasibility of the protocol.
Parallel work on unbounded expansion was done in [11] by Coudron and Yuen. While we independently proved that robust unbounded expansion is possible with log * (N) devices, [11] was the first to claim that (non-robust) unbounded expansion is possible with a constant number of devices. When we heard of their result, we realized that we also had the means to do the same, with fewer devices and also the added merit of robustness. (This was based on a result from the independent work of one of us [6] , which implies general security for cross-feeding protocols. See Remark 1.7.)
The Vazirani-Vidick protocol for untrusted-device key distribution [39] can be used as a randomness expansion protocol with a linear rate of expansion. It is not clear though if the analysis can be strengthened to allow larger expansion rate. Similarly, it is not clear (when used as a linear expansion protocol) whether their analysis can be strengthened to allow some in-between-round communications.
Distributing cryptographic keys is a foundational primitive for modern day cryptography. Unconditional secure quantum protocols for key distributions [4, 15, 22, 21, 5, 35] are among the most powerful applications of quantum information processing. Untrusted-device quantum key distribution was also the motivating problem that ushered the area of untrusted-device quantum cryptography [23, 3] , and has been studied by many authors. Most results achieving quantum security require a linear number of (non-communicating) devices. Notable exceptions are [1, 33] , which, however, suffer from the drawbacks of weak security parameters, inefficiency, and not tolerating noise. Vazirani and Vidick [39] resolved all those problems at once, achieving quantum security, robustness, and linear key rate (measured against the running time of the protocol), using one (two-part) untrusted devices (see [39] for a more comprehensive review of the literature.) Our result at submission matches those features of [39] .
In an earlier work [26] , the present authors characterized the class of all binary XOR games that are strong self-tests. The characterization is used critically in the current work.
Noise model. We now move to more technical discussions, starting with the noise model. Different implementation approaches may have their own appropriate model of noise. In this work as in [6] , we model noise in a "black-box" manner, quantifying noise in terms of deviations of the implementation from an ideal implementation. More specifically, fix two implementations Π andΠ, run on the same input state ρ. Consider the two stochastic processes of input-output pairs
implementationΠ of a untrusted device protocol is said to have a noise level η with respect to another implementation Π on an input set S if on any
Note that out model includes two types of (possibly adaptive) errors (and convex combinations of them): that each non-local game is played with a (sufficiently small) constant below the optimal quantum winning probability and that a (sufficiently small) constant fraction of the games are played arbitrarily while others are played optimally. Our definition facilitates the application of Azuma-Hoeffding inequality in establishing our noise-tolerance results. The one-shot protocol and technical statements of results. Our main protocol (see Figure 2 on the last page of this abstract) is essentially the same as the one used in the classical security results of Coudron, Vidick, and Yuen [10] (which is in turn closely related to that of Vazirani-Vidick). The main differences in our version of the protocol are the class of games used, and most importantly, the allowance of in-betweenrounds quantum communications. The games we use involve n parties, with n ≥ 2. Such a game is played by a single device, which consists of n components, where each component has a classical input/output interface. 2 For any nonlocal game G, let w G denote the highest probability with which a quantum strategy can win the game, and let f G = 1 − w G denote the smallest possible failure probability that can be achieved by a quantum strategy.
To produce near perfect random output, we need to apply quantum-proof randomness extractors to the outputs of protocol R. Those are deterministic functions Ext(X, S) on two arguments, X being the source, which in this case is the output of the protocol, and S being the perfectly random seed. It is known that there are quantum-proof randomness extractors Ext(X, S) that will convert any N bits X that have minentropy Ω(N) to near perfect output randomness of length Θ(N).
Here are some quantities that describe important properties of a randomness expansion protocol. Let y ≥ 0. We call a subnormalized classical-quantum state y-ideal if its normalization has ≥ y conditional min-entropy. Let s , c , λ be reals in [0, 1]. A randomness expansion protocol is said to have a yield of y extractable bits with a soundness error s if for any device D, the accepting portion of the final state is always within trace distance s of a subnormalized y-ideal state. It is said to have a completeness error c under a λ level of noise if there exists an implementation, referred to as the "ideal" implementation, so that for any implementation within λ-deviation from the ideal, the probability of aborting is always ≤ c . If both the soundness and the completeness errors are ≤ , we simply say the protocol has an error .
Our main result is the following. 2 We note that the literature on this subject has some differences in terminology. Some authors would use the word "device" in the way that we have used the word "component."
Theorem 1.2 (Main Theorem
The completeness claim follows from the Azuma-Hoeffding inequality. The majority of our paper is devoted to proving the soundness claim.
Note that the bits g 1 , . . . , g N can be generated by O(Nh(q)) uniformly random bits with an error exp(−Ω(qN)), where h denotes the Shannon entropy function. Therefore, when q is chosen to be small, the protocol needs only ω(log N) initial bits and one device to achieve Ω(N) extractable bits with negligible error. To obtain near perfect random bits, we apply a quantumproof strong randomness extractor, in particular one that extracts a source of a linear amount of conditional quantum min-entropy. The parameters of our protocols depend critically on the seed length of such extractors, thus we introduce the following definition. Such extractors exist with ν ≥ 1/2, e.g., Trevisan's extractors [38] shown to be quantum-proof by De et al. [12] . Thus μ ≥ 1/2. The definition of soundness error for producing y bits of perfect randomness is the same for producing extractable random bits, except that the ideal C-Q state conditioned on Success is the product state of y perfectly random bits and a quantum state. The following corollary follows directly by composing protocol R and an extractor with ν close to μ. As pointed out by Chung and Wu after this conference submission, with the parameters in Corollary 1.5, the running time of the protocol is T := Θ(2 k μ−ω ). Thus for any λ > 1, setting ω = λ 1+λ μ, the errors are exp(−Ω(log λ T)), which are negligible in T. That is, the protocol with those parameters achieves cryptographic quality of security (while still exponentially expanding.)
Once we have near perfect randomness as output, we can use it as the input to another instance of the protocol, thus expanding further with an accumulating error parameter. As the error parameters decrease at an exponential rate, they are dominated by the first set of errors. Remark 1.7. Expanding a fixed-length input to an arbitrary N-bit output using O(log * N) devices is straightforward by sequentially composing any exponentially expanding protocol (such as that of Vazirani and Vidick [40] ) over distinct devices. Fehr et al. [16] discussed the possibility of crossfeeding the outputs of two devices (i.e., giving the output of one device as the input to another, and then vice versa) so as to reduce the O(log * N) number of devices to a constant. There is an apparent obstacle for proving security for such an approach: once a device produces output, this output is now correlated with the device itself. When this output is fed to a second device to produce new output, one needs to show that the correlation with the first device does not persist. (If it did, then at the third iteration one would be feeding the first device a seed that was correlated with the first device itself, thus causing an insecurity.)
Coudron and Yuen [11] solved this composition problem by modifying a protocol of Reichardt-Unger-Vazirani [33] so that it turns a uniform-to-device input into an output almost uniform to the adversary. In combination with the exponentially expanding Vazirani-Vidick protocol [40] , this leads to (non-robust) unbounded expansion with 4 two-part devices.
We took a different path by noting that the composition problem can be solved without any additional processing, by an independent result of Chung, Shi and Wu [6] . Specifically, the Equivalence Lemma of [6] states that if a randomness expansion protocol is secure with a globally random input, then it is also automatically secure with any uniformto-device input. This means that the correlation of each device with its own output does not cause a problem. Consequently, unbounded expansion with 2 (two-part) devices can be achieved by cross-feeding any secure randomness expansion protocol.
We therefore have the following corollary, which is subsequent to the main result of [11] and offers the added merit of robustness and a smaller number of devices. We comment on the additional importance of robustness for unbounded expansion. By the nature of unbounded expansion, the accuracy parameter of the devices used cannot be allowed to depend on the length of the output. Thus any imperfection of the device will impose a limit on the output length, rendering unbounded expansion impossible. Thus robustness is essential for unbounded expansion to be practically useful.
The intuition for the proof of Corollary 1.8 is straightforward: we can cross-feed inputs and outputs between two devices so that at any stage, a device accepts input that is uniform to itself, and (by the Equivalence Lemma) produces output that is uniform to the other device. The errors that occur in cross-feeding add up linearly (by the triangle inequality) and the sum of these errors converges. This argument is written out in detail in the full paper.
Application: randomness amplification. To apply our protocol to randomness amplification, we choose q = Θ(1) for those uses of our protocol inside the Chung-Shi-Wu randomness amplification protocol, which converts an n-bit, minentropy ≥ k weak source to a near perfectly random output of Θ(k) bits. Then we apply Corollary 1.8 to expand to arbitrarily long near perfect randomness. While the untrusted-device quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol of Vazirani and Vidick [39] can also serve as a building block for the Chung-Shi-Wu protocol, the use of our protocol has two advantages: reduced quantum memory requirement (by allowing in-between-rounds communications) and flexibility of the non-local game used. We point out that the number of devices T = T(n, 1/ ) used as a function of the weak source length n and the error parameter grows super-polynomially (if μ < 1) or polynomially (if μ = 1). It remains a major open problem if T(n, 1/ ) can be substantially reduced or even be made a universal constant. We stress, however, that the limitation imposed by this function is better interpreted as limiting the achievable error, instead of computational efficiency. This is because, T could still scale efficiently as a function of the output length. For example, to output N bits, as long as = exp(−O(log ν N)), the number of devices is still polynomial in N. Therefore, the question of improving T is the question of broadening the application of the combined amplificationexpansion protocol to settings requiring inverse-polynomial or even cryptographic quality of error.
Application: robust untrusted-device key distribution. To apply our protocol to untrusted-device QKD between two parties Alice and Bob, we choose q in Theorem 1.2 to be a small constant, and have Alice interact with the first component of the device, while Bob interacts with all the other components. They share randomness for executing our protocol, as well as that for later stages for information reconciliation and randomness extraction. For those game rounds that the bit g is 1, Alice and Bob use the public channel to compare their device outputs. Once the protocol succeeds, they apply the standard post-processing to obtain the shared key. This gives a secure and robust untrusted-device QKD protocol with a linear rate of output length (measured against the input randomness length.) Subsequent to the submission to this conference, we included the full translation of Theorem 1.2 to QKD in our full paper. Thus one has a secure, robust, single (multi-part) untrusted-device QKD protocol in which the length of the initial randomness shared needs only to be polylogarithmic of the output key length. We leave the details to the full version [25] .
CENTRAL CONCEPTS AND PROOFS
While proving classical security of randomness expansion protocols is mainly appropriate applications of the AzumaHoeffding inequality, proving quantum security is much more challenging. The proof for the Vazirani-Vidick protocol [40] relies on a characterization of quantum smooth min-entropy based on the quantum-security of Trevisan's extractors [12] . We take a completely different approach which (for the central security result) does not make use of randomness extractors. Our approach includes multiple new techniques which we are hopeful will find applications elsewhere.
The application of quantum Rényi entropies.
A critical challenge in constructing our proofs was choosing the right measure of randomness. We use the quantum Rényi entropies which were first defined in [20] and further studied in [27, 41] . For any α > 1, and any density matrix ρ and any positive semidefinite operator σ, let The quantum Rényi entropies have a number of interesting properties (see [27] ). For our purposes, they are interesting because if (A, E) is a classical quantum system, the Rényi entropy of (A, E) provides a lower bound on the number of random bits than can be extracted from A. Specifically,
where H min (A | E) denotes the smooth min-entropy of A conditioned on E. (We prove this inequality by modifying a similar result for collision entropy [14] , [36] .) The use of quantum Rényi entropies for Protocol R is delicate because the parameter α must be chosen appropriately. If α is too large, the quantum Rényi entropy is not sensitive enough to detect the effect of the game rounds in Protocol R. On the other hand, if α is too close to 1, the bound on extractable bits obtained from (2.2) is not useful. As we will discuss later in this section, it turns out that it is ideal to choose α such that (α − 1) is proportional to the parameter q from Protocol R.
An uncertainty principle for Rényi entropy. Suppose that Q is a qubit, and E is a quantum system that is entangled with Q. Let ρ be a density operator which represents the state of E. Let {ρ 0 , ρ 1 } and {ρ + , ρ − } represent the subnormalized states that arise when Q is measured along the {0, 1}-basis and the {+, −}-basis. We prove the following. , then
This theorem asserts that if the quantity δ determined by the {0, 1} measurement is small, then the outcome of the {+, −}-measurement must be uncertain (as measured by the (1 + )-Rényi divergence). This parallels other uncertainty principles that have been used in quantum cryptography [37] .
Our proof of this result is based on a known matrix inequality for the (2 + 2 )-Schatten norm.
Certifying randomness from a device with trusted measurements. Let us say that a device with trusted measurements D is a single-part input-output device which receives a single bit as an input, and, depending on the value of the bit, performs one of two perfectly anti-commutative binary measurements on a quantum system, and outputs the result. The measurements of the device are trusted, but the state is unknown.
Suppose that we make the following modifications to the procedure that defines Protocol R.
1. Instead of a multi-part binary device, we use a singlepart binary device with trusted measurements.
2. Instead of playing a nonlocal game, at each round we simply use the bit g as input to the device and obtain an output bit o.
3. The output of single iteration of the protocol is either H, T, P, or F depending on whether the pair (g, o) is equal to (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), or (1, 1), respectively.
Let us refer to this modified procedure as "Protocol A." Protocols A and R both involve conditioning on a "success" event. One of the central difficulties we have found in establish quantum security is in determining the impact that this conditioning has on the randomness of the device D. In the classical security context, one can show that once we conditioning on the success event, "most" uses of the device D (in an appropriate sense) generate random outputs. By elementary arguments, the outputs therefore accumulate minentropy linearly over multiple iterations, and randomness expansion is achieved. Yet carrying this approach over to the quantum context-even with the assumption of trusted measurements-seemed to us to be quite difficult.
We have found a useful way to manage the difficulty of the success event. Rather than directly considering discrete "success" and "abort" events, we consider a graded measurement of performance which interpolates between the two.
Suppose that E is a quantum system which is initially entangled with a trusted-measurement device D. For the purposes of this discussion, let us make the simplifying assumption that the reduced state ρ = ρ E of the system E is a completely mixed state. The joint state of E together with the (four-valued) output of a single iteration of Protocol A can be considered as an operator on E ⊕ E ⊕ E ⊕ E, where E denotes the state-space of E. Using notation from Theorem 2.1, this state can be expressed as
(2.5) (The summands in this expression correspond to outputs H, T, P, and F, respectively.) Suppose that we are measuring the randomness of the outputs of this single iteration with respect to a second party who possesses E and who knows the value of the input bit g. Then, an appropriate measure of randomness would be the Rényi divergence D α (ρ χ) with respect to the operator
We need to choose a value for the parameter α, and it turns out that simply taking α = 1 + q is useful. We then have the following.
One could hope that this quantity is strictly smaller than d α (ρ I), but this is not always so (for example, for measurements on a maximally entangled Bell state). But consider instead the modified expression
Theorem 2.1 implies that this quantity is always less than C −1 d 1+q (ρ I), where C > 1 is a fixed constant. (Essentially, this is because if the quantity δ is large, then the introduction of the (1/2) coefficient lowers the value of the expression significantly, and if δ is small, then (2.4) implies the desired bound.) If we let 1 ] is large. Now let B denote the full output register of Protocol A, and let Λ BE denote the joint state of E and B at the conclusion of the protocol. Let Σ be an operator on BE defined by
, and f = f (b) are defined as the number of appearances of the letters H, T, P, and F, respectively, in sequence b. An inductive argument proves that d 1+q (Λ Σ) ≤ C −N . This inequality is sufficient to deduce that the Rényi entropy of the "success" state Λ s grows linearly in N. One can therefore deduce that (for appropriate parameters) the outputs of Protocol A contain a linear number of extractable quantum proof bits. The reasoning sketched above is given in detail in the full paper. In fact, we prove something that is stronger: if Protocol A is executed with a partially trusted measurement device (i.e., a measurement device whose measurements are anticommutative only with a certain positive probability) then it produces a linear amount of randomness. This generalization, as we will see, is what allows to carry over our results into the fully device-independent setting.
Simulation results for partially trusted devices. The second central insight that enables our results is that nonlocal games simulate partially trusted devices. When certain nonlocal games are played-even with a device that is completely untrusted-their outcomes match the behavior of a device that is partially trusted.
Let us begin by formalizing a class of devices. (Our formalism is a variation on that which has appeared in other papers on untrusted devices, such as [33] Now we define a somewhat more specific type of device. Suppose that E is a single-part binary quantum device. Then let us say that E is a partially trusted device with parameters (v, h) if the measurement operators N (1)
T that E uses on input 1 decompose as
where P T is perfectly anti-commutative with the other measurement N
T , and Q T satisfies Q T ≤ 1 (and is otherwise unspecified). Essentially, the device behaves as follows. On input 0, it performs a perfect measurement. On input 1, it does one of the following at random: it performs a perfectly anti-commuting measurement (probability = v), or it performs an unknown measurement (probability = 1 − v − h), or it ignores its quantum system and merely outputs a perfect coin flip (probability = h). (The second possibility is what we call a "dishonest mistake," and the third is what we call an "honest mistake.")
We wish to prove that the behavior of untrusted devices in nonlocal games can be simulated by partially trusted devices. This again is an example of a task that is fairly easy in the classical security context but difficult in the quantum context. For example, if one knows that a quantum device performs at a superclassical level at a particular nonlocal game, then one knows that its outcomes are at least partly random, thus can be "simulated" by a biased coin flip (or a "partially trusted" coin flip). But to prove quantum security one needs a stronger notion of simulation-one that allows for the possibility quantum side information.
The basis for our simulation result is previous work by the present authors on quantum self-testing [26] . We consider games from the class of strong self-tests which we referred to in section 1. In [26] we proved a criterion for strong self-tests. This criterion is a building block in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.3. Let G be a strong self-test, and let D be an (untrusted) binary device with n components. Then, the behavior of D in Protocol R can be simulated by a partially trusted device.
Concretely, the theorem asserts the following. Let E be a purifying system for D. Then there exists a partially-trusted measurement device D , with purifying system E , such that the state of the outputs of Protocol R taken together with E is isomorphic to the state of N outputs of D taken together with E .
This result is proved in the full paper. We briefly sketch the proof. We can reduce to the case where dim Q i = 2 and each measurement operator is projective. After an appropriate choice of basis, we have 
where {P 1 , . . . , P 2 n−1 } are rational functions depending on the game. Using the strong self-testing condition, we show the existence of another reverse diagonal matrix R with entries β 1 , . . . , β 2 n−1 , β 2 n−1 , . . . , β 1 which anti-commutes with M
1 ⊗ I ⊗ . . . ⊗ I and which satisfies M − R + R = M . This implies that M satisfies the decomposition (2.9) which defines a partially trusted device.
Proving the existence of the sequence β 1 , . . . , β 2 n−1 is matter of manipulations of complex numbers. One surprising aspect of this proof is that depends critically on the fact that G is not only a self-test, but a strong self-test.
The proof of security of Protocol R. We define a third protocol, Protocol A', which is the same as Protocol A except that a partially trusted measurement device is used rather than a fully trusted measurement device. We show that Protocol A' produces a linear amount of entropy (using the general approach sketched above for Protocol A). Protocol R can be simulated by Protocol A' for an appropriately chosen partially trusted device. Since Protocol A' produces a linear amount of min-entropy, the same is true of Protocol R. This completes the proof.
Numerical bounds. The proof methods we have discussed are sufficient to give actual numerical bounds for the amount of randomness generated by Protocol R. Let Π be the actual function that is used in the proof of Theorem 2.1. Then, the limiting function
is given by the following expression:
If G is a strong self-test, let v G denote the trust coefficient of G -that is, the largest real number v such that G simulates a partially trusted device with parameters (v, h). Then our results imply that the linear rate of output of Protocol R is lower bounded by the quantity π(η/v G ). In particular, a positive rate is achieved provided that π(η/v G ) > 0. Using (2.12), a positive rate is therefore achieved if η < 0.11 · v G .
As an example calculation, we show that v GHZ ≥ 0.14. Therefore, the GHZ game achieves a positive linear rate provided that η < 0.11 · 0.14 = 0.0154.
FURTHER DIRECTIONS
A natural goal at this point is to improve the certified rate of Protocol R. This is important for the practical realization of our protocols. By the discussion above, this reduces to two simple questions. First, what techniques are there for computing the trust coefficient v G of a binary XOR game? Second, is it possible to reprove Theorem 2.1 in such a way that the limiting function (2.11) becomes larger? A related question is to improve the key rate of the QKD protocol. The "hybrid" technique of Vazirani and Vidick [39] for mixing the CHSH game with a trivial game with unit quantum winning strategy may extend to general binary XOR games.
It would also be interesting to explore whether Theorem 1.2 could be extended to nonlocal games outside the class of strong self-tests. Such an extension will not only facilitate the realization of those protocols, but also will further identify the essential feature of quantum information enabling those protocols. As the characterization of strong self-tests is critical for our proof, developing a theory of robust self-testing beyond binary XOR games may be useful for our question. It is also conceivable that there exist fairly broad conditions under which a classical security proof, which is typically much easier to establish, automatically implies quantum security. We consider identifying such a whole-sale security lifting principle as a major open problem.
A different direction to extend our result is to prove security based on physical principles more general than quantum mechanics, such as non-signaling principle, or information causality [29] .
Our protocols require some initial perfect randomness to start with. The Chung-Shi-Wu protocol [6] relaxes this requirement to an arbitrary min-entropy source and tolerates a universal constant level of noise. However, those were achieved at a great cost on the number of non-communicating devices. A major open problem is if our protocol can be modified to handle non-uniform input.
Randomness expansion can be thought of as a "seeded" extractions of randomness from untrusted quantum devices, as pointed out by Chung, Shi and Wu [6] in their "Physical Randomness Extractors" framework. Our one-shot and unbounded expansion results demonstrate a tradeoff between the seed length and the output length different from that in classical extractors. What is the maximum amount of randomness one can extract from a device of a given amount of entanglement (i.e. is the exponential rate optimal for one device)? What can one say about the tradeoff between expansion rate and some proper quantity describing the communication restrictions? Answers to those questions will reveal fundamental features of untrusted quantum devices as a source for randomness extraction, and will hopefully lead to an intuitive understanding of where the randomness comes from.
Yet another important direction forward is to prove security in more complicated composition scenarios than the cross-feeding protocol. As pointed out by Barrett, Colbeck and Kent [2] , a device reused may store previous runs' information thus potentially may cause security problem in sequentially composed QKD protocols. While such "memory attack" appears not to be a problem for sequential compositions of our randomness expansion protocol, it may for other more complicated compositions. Thus it is desirable to design untrusted-device protocols and prove their security under broader classes of compositions. (The test probability.) G : An n-player nonlocal game that is a strong self-test [26] . D : An untrusted device (with n components) that can play G repeatedly and cannot receive any additional information. In a single use the different components cannot communicate; in between uses, there is no restriction.
Protocol R:
1. A bit g ∈ {0, 1} is chosen according to a biased (1 − q, q) distribution. 2. If g = 1 ("game round"), then an input string is chosen at random from {0, 1} n (according a probability distribution specified by G) and given to D. Depending on the outputs, a"P" (pass) or an "F" (fail) is recorded according to the rules of the game G. 
